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Abstract. A representative agent economy with a resource stock, polluting emissions,
productive, abatement and foreign capital, trade, and technical progress, is used to
contrast environmental policy, which internalises amenity and productivity values, with
sustainability policy, which achieves some form of intergenerational equity.
Environmental policy comprises a tax on emissions and a subsidy on the resource stock
equal to the respective externalised costs or benefits. Sustainability policy comprises
a capital and/or consumption tax to change the effective utility discount rate.
Environmental policy can reduce the strength of sustainability policy needed. More
specialised results are derived in a closed economy with a non-renewable resource and
no technical progress, and in a small open economy with few environmental effects.
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In the voluminous government literature on sustainable development since
the Brundtland report (WCED 1987) popularised the idea, it is often hard to
distinguish sustainability policy from environmental policy. A document on
a country’s approach to sustainable development may start with general
statements about sustainability as safeguarding the well-being of future
generations, but then continue with little more than a description of
environmental policies. Detailed policies are spelt out on air and water
pollution, solid waste, traffic congestion, habitat and biodiversity protection,
etcetera, perhaps with special emphasis on the enduring nature of some
forms of environmental damage; but nothing is said about other policies that
may be necessary or desirable to sustain well-being.
If governments truly believe there are fairly imminent limits to the
substitutability of human-made capital and knowledge for environmental
resources, then this implicitly "strong" approach to sustainability, which
treats environmental protection as the essence of sustainability policy, would
be logical. But by the very limits of their environmental policies, most
governments reveal that they do not much believe in such limits to
substitutability. (We express no view here on whether, and if so where,
limits to substitutability do actually exist. At the macroeconomic level, this
is a hugely difficult empirical question which has so far eluded any answer
which commands consensus. This is why we write about what governments
believe, rather than what is true.) Most governments implicitly place finite
rather than infinite values on marginal declines in environmental resources.
So it seems relevant at least to current policy debate to adopt here the
"weak" approach to sustainability, and assume capital-resource
substitutability at the margin.
1Given this, we confirm here the obvious intuition that if it is needed at all,
sustainability policy should include non-environmental aspects of providing
more for future generations, such as encouraging more saving and hence
capital investment to substitute for some degree of future environmental
resource depletion. Sustainability and environmental policies will thus be
at least partially distinct. The aim of this paper is to clarify these
distinctions, using a conventional theoretical framework of a dynamic,
optimising economy with identical agents, represented by one agent making
decisions in continuous time.
To do this, we must define the two types of policy more precisely. We
assume that each agent would like to optimise society’s development by
maximising some well-defined measure of intertemporal welfare, based on
individual preferences. However, competitive markets alone will not
maximise welfare, because each agent treats various environmental costs that
affect welfare as external to their private optimising decisions.
Environmental policy is then the time path of all incentives, such as emission
taxes and resource conservation subsidies, with which the government can
intervene in decentralised markets to internalise these externalities, and thus
achieve the optimal path of development. We do not enquire into, and our
theoretical model will not distinguish, when and why tradeable emission
permits or (non-tradeable) emission standards might be preferable to taxes
and subsidies, or what are the efficiency gains of taxes or tradeable permits
over standards.
By contrast, sustainability policy is the time path of incentives which
together persuade agents in a decentralised economy to achieve a
collectively-desired "sustainability" goal. Such a goal is most generally
defined as any departure, from maximising a social welfare function that is
2based solely on individual agents’ own time preferences, in a way that could
be said to improve intergenerational equity. Within this, we are especially
interested in departures that focus on the path of per capita utility over time,
for example by requiring that utility remain forever constant, non-declining,
or sustainable, since we feel these are the most natural formalisation of
"safeguarding the well-being of future generations". If greater precision and
simplicity in analytic work is called for, we use forever constant utility as
a sustainability goal.
The conventional (neoclassical) literature on sustainability has mostly
focused on defining and justifying it,
1 or on measuring it,
2 rather than on
identifying policies to achieve it, which is our focus. However, there is also
plenty of literature about environmental and/or general intergenerational
policies in a dynamic economy, which unless otherwise stated uses an
overlapping generations rather than a representative agent (RA) demographic
format for society. For our purposes, it is relevant to divide this literature
into four parts. First, papers like John and Pecchenino (1994) and Smulders
(2000, in RA format) provided analysis only from the viewpoint of a social
planner. Thus no policy instruments as such were considered; though John
and Pecchenino set the "golden rule" goal of maximising steady state utility,
and Smulders noted whether or not consumption (and thus utility) rose or
1. For examples, see Howarth (1992), Dasgupta (1994), or Chichilnisky (1996) and
Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden (2001). Solow (1993, p171) made the target of a
sustainability policy clear, with his claim that "...we owe to the future a volume of
investment that will compensate for this year’s withdrawal from the inherited stock".
However, he gave no analysis of what policy instruments can achieve this volume of
investment if market forces do not.
2. For examples, see Pearce and Atkinson (1993), Asheim (1997), Aronsson et al
(1997), Atkinson et al (1997), Brekke (1997) and Weitzman (1997).
3fell on a steady state path. Second are papers which consider a dynamic
instrument of environmental policy to internalise externalities, but either no
explicit sustainability goal (as in Bovenberg and Smulders 1995, Mohtadi
1996, both in RA format, and Jouvet et al 2000), or no policy to achieve this
goal (John et al 1995, which again adopted a golden rule goal for the social
planner). Third are papers like Howarth and Norgaard (1990), Mourmouras
(1993) and Krautkraemer and Batina (1999), which analysed some kind of
sustainability goal, but had no conventional externalities, and hence no
environmental policy.
Finally there are papers considering both environmental policy and
sustainability policy. Howarth and Norgaard (1992), Marini and
Scaramozzino (1995), Howarth (1998), Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) and
Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) all used an overlapping generations format; this
allows the use of intergenerational transfers as a key instrument of
sustainability policy, in pursuit of goals such as maximising the
undiscounted sum of generations’ lifetime utilities. Such transfers will not
be available here because of our RA format. Becker’s (1982, in RA format)
instrument to achieve maximin (hence constant) utility is direct manipulation
of the interest rate path, which we exclude: it would be difficult to sustain
in a small open economy, and in any case is not easy to reconcile with the
use of interest rates for macroeconomic stabilisation. The analysis in Pezzey
(1992) foreshadowed that here, but was much simpler and more restricted.
What is new about our treatment, in comparison to this existing literature
on both environmental policy and sustainability policy, is the combination
of the following features. Pollution, resource depletion, physical capital
accumulation, trade and (exogenous) technical progress are all included (but
not education and knowledge accumulation). Compared to much literature,
4our functional forms are more general. The focus is on transitional rather
than steady state paths. It is shown how applying environmental policy may
reduce the required strength of sustainability policy. Finally, of many policy
instruments considered, the natural ones to use for sustainability policy in an
RA format, at least in theory, turn out to be a capital subsidy or falling
consumption tax rate, which together encourage saving now and consuming
later. Our focus on encouraging saving as a sustainability policy is
supported by empirical measurement studies following the example of Pearce
and Atkinson (1993), but has so far received little attention in the policy
literature.
Our framework also allows two more specialised topics to be investigated.
One is that resource incentives cannot prevent unsustainability in the form
of asymptotically declining utility, in a closed economy with constant
discounting, no resource discovery or renewal, and no technical progress.
The other is that sustainability policy has no effect at all on resource
management and domestic production and investment, in a small open
economy with few environmental effects.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the most general
economy to be considered, along with reasons why full generality cannot be
achieved, and derives the environmental policies needed to internalise all
externalities. Section 3 discusses but does not formally analyse a rationale
for sustainability policy, and then analyses this policy in the same economy,
and its general interaction with environmental policy. Section 4 uses
specific functional forms to show a precise effect of environmental policy
on sustainability policy. Section 5 considers the two more specialised topics
just mentioned, and Section 6 concludes.
52. Environmental policy in a fairly general economy
2.1 The economy
A fully general representative-agent, continuous-time, deterministic
economy would be similar to that in Asheim and Weitzman (forthcoming).
At any time t ≥ 0, there is a "consumption" vector C(t) of everything,
including environmental amenities, that influences the representative agent’s
instantaneous utility U(C(t)). Likewise, there is a vector K(t) of stocks of
built, knowledge and human capital, and of all environmental resources. The
relationship between C and K can be given by a convex production
possibilities set Π {.}:
[C(t),K(t)] ∈Π {K(t),t} [1]
in which we have included the possibility of exogenous shifts in production
possibilities, as shown by the dependence of Π {.} on t as well as K.
However, the form of [1] is too general for our purposes. It hides specific
features that make environmental resources important to policymakers. In
[1] one cannot distinguish renewable from non-renewable resources, flow
from stock pollution, externalised effects on utility from those on production,
or domestic from foreign variables. Almost all dynamic economy-
environmental models that address policy issues therefore include specific
features; and inevitably the more features included, the more complex is the
model. We include in the same model many features treated separately by
Hartwick (1990), Maler (1991), Hamilton (1994), Vellinga and Withagen
(1996), Sefton and Weale (1996) and many others, as follows.
The economy is generally open, competitive and small in relation to all
world markets, though a closed economy can readily be considered as a
special case. The economy’s stock of a composite, depletable, natural
6resource is S(t). This has both non-renewable and renewable characteristics,
by being discovered at rate D(t) and growing naturally at a stock-dependent
rate G(S). It is depleted at rate R(t), so:
S = D + G(S)−R; S(t) ≥ 0; S(0) = S0 > 0, given; )
GS (:= ∂ G/∂ S) > 0 assumed for the economy’s operating range.) [2]
3
Two more stocks in the domestic economy are productive capital K(t) and
abatement capital Ka(t). They each increase at rates of investment I(t) and
Ia(t), minus depreciation at a common rate δ >0 :
K = I − δ K; K(t) ≥ 0; K(0) = K0 > 0, given; [3]
Ka = Ia − δ Ka; Ka(t) ≥ 0; Ka(0) = Ka0 > 0, given. [4]
Transient, polluting emissions E(.) depend positively on domestic resource
use (extraction R(t) minus net exports Rx(t)), and negatively on abatement
capital Ka(t), abatement current expenditure a(t), and time (exogenous
technical progress in abatement).
4 Production F(.) of a consumption-
investment good depends positively on productive capital, domestic resource
use, resource stock, and time (exogenous technical progress in production),
3. It would be more realistic to have many natural resources, and to distinguish non-
renewable from renewable ones. However, with many renewable resources, their
ecological interactions (where the stock Si of one resource affects the growth Gj of
another resource, so that the scalar GS is replaced by a matrix {∂ Gj/∂ Si}) cause big
complications in calculating stock effects, which add little further insight.
4. Contrast this with Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998), where the "dirty" variable
creating emissions is the capital stock, and Jouvet et al (2000), where the dirty
variable is output. In both papers, a tax on capital is desirable for environmental
reasons.
7and negatively on emissions.
5 The sum of production and net goods
imports M(t) is divided among consumption C(t), productive and abatement
investments, abatement current expenditure, and the combined costs
V(R,D,S,t) of discovering and extracting resources:
F[K,R−Rx,S,E(R−Rx,Ka,a,t),t]+M = C + I + Ia + a + V(R,D,S,t) [5]
FK, FR, FS >0 ,FKK, FRR, FSS <0 ,FKR >0 ,FE <0 ,FEE <0 ,Ft > 0 [6]
ER >0 ,EK, Ea, Et <0 ; VR, VD >0 ,VS, Vt < 0 [7]
The economy has a stock Kf(t) of foreign capital (possibly negative,
meaning debt) which earns a return at the exogenously varying world
interest rate r(t), while its net resource exports Rx(t) are sold at exogenously
varying world prices Q
x(t). Foreign capital therefore grows as:
Kf = r(t)Kf + Q
x(t).Rx − M; Kf(0) = Kf0, given [8]
The case of a closed economy can easily be obtained, by eliminating net
resource exports Rx and net goods imports M from the production equation
[5], and deleting equation [8]. However, we do exclude the much more
general and complex case of a large, open economy, which has power in one
or more of world capital or resource markets. Prices r and Q
x would then
depend on M and/or R
x, and strategic interactions with other economies
would have to be considered.
Instantaneous utility U(.) depends positively on consumption and resource
stock, and negatively on emissions:
5. We could also model the effects of a cumulative pollutant on output or utility, but
this adds little further insight to the emissions and resource stock effects included here.
8U = U(C(t),S(t),E(t)); )
UC, US >0 ,UCC, USS <0 ,UCS ≥ 0, UE <0 ,UEE <0 ,l i m t→∞ UC =0 .) [ 9 ]
Lastly, the economy chooses its control variables (of which an independent
set is consumption C, abatement current expenditure a, abatement investment
Ia, resource discoveries D, net imports M, resource extraction R, and net
resource exports Rx), as if to maximise (intertemporal) welfare W(0). This
is the generalised present value (GPV) of utility, using a discount factor φ (t):
W(0) := ∫ 0
∞ φ (t)U(C(t),S(t),E(t))dt; φ (t)>0 ,φ (t)<0 ,φ (0) = 1. [10]
6
Since any (intertemporally Pareto-) efficient development path can be
found by maximising welfare in a competitive economy for some discount
factor path (Takayama 1985, p188), the generality of φ in [10] includes any
efficient path as possibly being optimal. All functional forms in [2]-[9] are
assumed to be as smooth and convex as is needed for the existence of a
unique and interior development path which maximises welfare. This will
be called "optimal", or with the qualifications "socially optimal" or
occasionally "GPV-optimal" if the context is not clear. If φ (t)=e
−ρ t with ρ
> 0 constant, W will then be called just "present value" (PV), and the path
maximising W(0) is "PV-optimal". However, we also often consider a
variable discount rate ρ (t)=−φ (t)/φ (t) corresponding to a general discount
factor φ (t) = exp[−∫ 0
tρ (z)dz]. The context will make clear whether or not ρ
is constant.
6. When the utility discount rate −φ /φ is not constant, it may be awkward to regard
W(0) as really "welfare", since for instance W(t) (defined in Section 3.2) rises on the
constant consumption path discovered by Solow (1974). So formally, W(0) should just
be regarded as what the economy maximises.
92.2 Environmental policy
As in most of the literature reviewed at the outset, we define the
economy’s environmental policy as just the time path of price incentives
which the government must create, to induce private individuals in a
decentralised equilibrium to follow the socially optimal path. Such
intervention is needed because individuals are presumed to maximise W(0)
imperfectly, by ignoring (externalising) the "environmental" effects of their
actions when making marginal choices of control variables. Such effects are
here taken to be the partial derivatives of utility with respect to the resource
stock, US, and emissions, UE; of production with respect to emissions, FE;o f
discovery and extraction costs with respect to stocks, VS; and of resource
growth with respect to the stock, GS. The development path chosen as a
result of such externalities is called "privately optimal". What is or is not
externalised is part of the model’s design, rather than required by logic. So
for example, to model pollution by greenhouse gases, it would be the world
rather than domestic resource stock (or instead, an explicit pollution stock)
which affects utility or production. Or if renewable resources are privately
owned, there would be no reason to suppose that GS is externalised. Also,
externalities from human-made resources like knowledge or education could
be treated by similar techniques, but by convention such resources are not
included in environmental policy.
Environmental policy is the set of incentives {τ i(t)} (a tax when positive,
or subsidy when negative) that the government can create to affect
individuals’ budget constraints, and hence make the privately optimal path
coincide with the socially optimal path. Any net revenues from (or costs of)
the incentive system are assumed to be refunded to (or taxed from) the
representative consumer as lump sums which do not affect any marginal
choices. To institute these incentive schemes credibly for all time would be
10difficult, but along with most optimal control modelling, we do not explore
what constitutional innovations this might require in a democratic society.
Neither do we consider the well-known political difficulties of collecting the
lump sum taxes needed when the incentive scheme has net costs, or the
administrative difficulties of managing tax rates that vary over time.
By using the device in Pemberton and Ulph (2001) of treating time t as a
productive stock (with t = 1), we can build the various ways in which
production possibilities change exogenously (from technical progress or from
changing terms of trade) into a standard optimal control format. The current
value Hamiltonian for solving the social maximisation problem [10] subject
to conditions [2]-[9] is then




















t are the respective co-state variables.
As for policy instruments, we do not consider quantity restrictions, and
confine ourselves to proportional taxes with no thresholds or progressive
changes in rates, unlike most income taxes in practice.
7 There are still
many instruments available: taxes (or subsidies when rates are negative) on
consumption (τ C), productive capital (τ K), productive investment (τ I),
abatement current spending (τ a), abatement capital (τ Ka), abatement
investment (τ Ia), resource discoveries (τ D), resource extraction (τ R), resource
7. Mohtadi (1996, Section 3.3) considers a quantity restriction which increases
emissions abatement, but this is modelled as a "mandatory change in a parameter
value", whereas here we have an explicit emission flow which can be taxed.
11extraction costs (τ V), net resource exports (τ Rx), resource stock (τ S), emissions
(τ E), net goods imports (τ M) and foreign capital (τ Kf). However, all of these
instruments can be shown to be distortionary, apart from the emissions tax
τ E and the resource stock subsidy −τ S. Appendix 1 gives a partial proof of
this, but for brevity it does not analyse every other tax, only taxes τ C on
consumption, τ K on capital and τ R on resource extraction.
8 These analyses
will also prove useful later when discussing sustainability policy. The
current value Hamiltonian [11] is then replaced by
H = U(C,S −,E −(R−Rx,Ka,a,t))
+ Ψ
K [F(K,R−Rx,S −,E −(R−Rx,Ka,a,t),t)+M−C−δ K−a−Ia−V(R,D,S −,t)]
− Ψ







Here Ω is the lump sum refund of all net tax revenues, and overbars show
the environmental variables S − and E − that individuals ignore when making
private, maximising choices. Appendix 1(c) shows that the required
environmental policy at any time t is then the combination, with all
quantities as measured on the socially optimal path, of:
τ C(t) = 0 [13]
τ K(t)= τ R(t) = 0 [14]
τ E(t)= −1/Ea(t)=− UE(t)/UC(t) − FE(t) > 0 [15]
−τ S(t)= US(t)/UC(t)+FS(t) − VS(t)+VD(t)GS(t) > 0 [16]
The intuition is simple. Tax τ E internalises −UE/UC, the dollar-value amenity
cost of emissions, and −FE, the productivity cost of emissions. Subsidy −τ S
internalises the various benefits of the resource stock: US/UC, the dollar-value
8. An investment tax/subsidy τ I may be easier to administer in practice than a
consumption tax τ C or capital tax τ K. However, the expression for its required form
is more complex, and it does not add any extra insight, so we omit it.
12amenity benefit; FS, the productivity benefit; −VS, the benefit from lower
extraction costs; and VDGS, the benefit from the lower discoveries needed
thanks to faster resource growth. Any taxes other than [15] and [16] will
cause distortions that reduce welfare. One can thus be reasonably confident
that, apart from the important exceptions of international interactions and
cross-border externalities, "internalise all externalities at their source" is a
useful general rule for dynamic environmental policy, at least in the first best
case where time-varying incentives and lump sum taxes are available.
Note in passing that the UE/UC and US/UC terms in [15] and [16] would
typically be measured in dollars per tonne of emissions or resource stock.
Data for them would have to come from the same, practically difficult non-
market valuation exercises used for other methods of resource accounting
and sustainability measurement, and the non-measurability of the utility
concepts involved here does not add any extra difficulty.
3. Sustainability policy in the same economy
3.1 Sustainability policy versus social welfare maximisation
Before discussing the details of a sustainability policy, one must first
recognise that whatever it is, its aim must be distinct from maximising social
welfare as defined by the generalised present value W(0) in [10] using the
representative agent’s discount factor φ (t). Sustainability policy is
meaningless as a distinct concept in the neoclassical context unless one
accepts that governments may rationally seek a policy which may not
necessarily maximise W(0).
13How this apparent schizophrenia can exist, and how such a government
could be democratically elected by agents who maximise present value
(albeit imperfectly) in their private choices, are important questions in the
economics of sustainability, which have not yet been fully resolved. One
could just appeal to the idea in Marglin (1963, p98) that "...the Economic
Man and the Citizen are for all intents and purposes two different
individuals", and identify Economic Man as the private present-value-
maximiser, and the Citizen as the supporter of sustainability as a public
policy goal. More satisfying would be to develop the informal idea in Daly
and Cobb (1989, p39) and Howarth and Norgaard (1993, p351) that
sustainability is a partly-public good, because of the sexual intermixing of
bequests across successive generations. We do not add any analysis here,
and just accept that sustainability policy aims at some notion of
intergenerational equity that is not captured by the welfare function W(0).
3.2 Optimal and non-optimal sustainability policies
Whereas maximising welfare is a natural aim of environmental policy, the
exact aim of sustainability policy is harder to define. Three possible aims
which make sense in our neoclassical economy are:
(i) achieving constant utility forever (after Solow 1974 and Hartwick
1977);
(ii) avoiding any decline in utility, by ensuring that utility is always
sustainable (after Pearce, Markandya and Barbier 1989 and Pezzey
1992);
(iii) avoiding any decline in welfare W(t) measured from time t onwards,
defined as ∫ t
∞ [φ (s)/φ (t)]U[C(s),S(s),E(s)]ds, after Riley (1980).
9
9. Non-declining wealth or non-declining aggregate capital, two further well-known
alternatives suggested by Pearce et al, are best viewed in our context as (possibly
14Any of these aims can in turn be related to the socially optimal and
privately optimal paths of the economy in one of at least three ways:
(a) The sustainability aim is met on the privately optimal path, without any
policy intervention. There is then no need for a sustainability policy
as such.
(b) The aim is met on the socially optimal, but not on the privately optimal
path. (The converse is logically possible, but unlikely.) Environmental
policy will then achieve sustainability as an automatic side-effect.
(c) The aim is met on neither the privately optimal nor the socially optimal
path. There is then a need for an explicit sustainability policy. This
is the only case we consider hereafter.
Having assumed the need for an explicit sustainability policy, we further
have to make clear if it is to be optimal. That is, should sustainability be
achieved with minimum loss of welfare W(0), which could be viewed as the
best compromise of the aims of environmental policy and of sustainability
policy? Let us consider this case first. If it exists, an optimal sustainable
path is also Pareto efficient. From Takayama (1985) as already noted, this
means that the optimal sustainable path maximises some measure of welfare,
say W
σ (0), based on a discount factor exp[−∫ 0
tσ (z)dz], where σ (t)i sa
"sustainable" discount rate. This rate is different from the private agent’s
ρ (t), and reflects whatever degree of intergenerational equity (in a general
form, constrained only by Pareto efficiency) that society collectively wants.
The optimal sustainable path therefore satisfies first order conditions which
are identical to those for the socially optimal path, save that σ (t) replaces
ρ (t). Appendix 1(d) shows that one might hope the set of taxes and
subsidies
flawed) means, rather than fundamental ends, of sustainability policy.
15τ C(t)/[1+τ C(t)] = σ (t) − ρ (t) [17]
τ K(t)=τ R(t) = 0 [18]
τ E(t)= − UE(t)/UC(t) − FE(t)=1 / Ea(t) > 0 [19]
−τ S(t)= US(t)/UC(t)+FS(t) − VS(t)+VD(t)GS(t) > 0 [20]
would form the optimal sustainability policy, by inducing the representative
agent to follow the path that maximises W
σ (0).
10 However, Appendix 1(d)
also shows that the consumption tax τ C causes a distortion which forces the
policy intervention path away from the W
σ -maximising path. So in general
there is no exact optimal sustainability policy using the policy instruments
considered here.
11
If one abandons the requirement for sustainability to be optimal, then
sustainability policies can generally be found. However, they may not be
well defined, because by the argument above they cannot contain any
maximising aim as well as a sustainability aim, since a path that achieved
both aims would be Pareto-efficient, and thus unable to be achieved by
policy intervention. So for example, a path of maximum constant utility
cannot be reached by policy intervention, because it must be the socially
optimal solution for some discount rate path σ (t), and therefore unattainable.
10. The intuition behind [17] can readily be seen if both discount rates σ and ρ are
constant, with 0 < σ < ρ because σ expresses stronger concern for future generations.
τ C(t) would then be a falling consumption tax or rising consumption subsidy, which
gives an incentive to delay consumption and bring forward productive investment. It
would change an individual’s effective utility discount rate from ρ to σ , so this is
almost a way of achieving Becker’s direct manipulation of this rate.
11. This minor impossibility result is absent from overlapping generations models,
because the latter assume the feasibility of lump sum intergenerational transfers, which
can shift consumption to the future without the use of a distorting marginal incentive.
16However, Appendix 1(e) shows that constant utility can be achieved
suboptimally by choosing a capital tax τ K(t) and consumption tax τ C(t) such
that
τ K + τ C/(1+τ C)
= FK − δ − ρ +[ ( η /C)(USS+UEE)+UCSS+UCEE]/UC
where η (C): =−UCC /( UC/C). [21]
From the above, it is clear that environmental policies and sustainability
policies interact. The environmental policy that would maximise welfare in
the presence of a constant-utility sustainability policy such as [21], and that
could not be Pareto-efficient for reasons already discussed, must generally
be different from the welfare-maximising, environmental policy path defined
by [13]-[16] which applies when there is no sustainability policy. This
echoes a central result of Howarth and Norgaard (1992), that environmental
valuations (here the sizes of the emissions tax τ E and the resource stock
subsidy −τ S) do not exist in a vacuum, independently of society’s view on
intergenerational equity. There will also be an interaction in the other
direction. We conjecture that environmental policy to internalise a flow
externality will have no effect on a sustainability policy, while environmental
policy to internalise a stock externality will reduce the required strength of
a sustainability policy. However, it is only in simple cases with specific
functional forms, as illustrated next, that we can be clear about the sign and
magnitude of such effects.
4. An example of the interaction of sustainability and environmental
policies
We give here a simple example of an economy where asymptotic
sustainability and environmental policies can be distinguished in both form
17and strength, and also interact. The economy is a variant on Stiglitz (1974),
being closed, with no capital depreciation, a known, non-renewable resource,
no emissions, and just one externality from the resource stock’s role in a





ν t = K + C;
0<α , γ , χ <1 ; α +γ +χ≤ 1; ν > 0 [22]
Utility is isoelastic and purely materialistic:
U(C)=C
1−η ,0 < η < 1. [23]
The utility discount rate ρ is a positive constant. To ensure respectively that
the welfare integral converges and socially optimal utility declines
asymptotically, we assume
(1−α )ρ >( 1 −η )ν and ρ > ν /γ . [24]
Using results from Appendix 1 (denoted [A3], [A5], etc), we compute
three asymptotic, balanced growth paths for this economy: the socially
optimal path, the privately optimal path with sustainability policy only, and
the privately optimal path with both sustainability and environmental
policies. We denote gX := g<X>: =l i m t→∞ X/X for any variable X. Since the
resource is non-renewable, S = −R, hence gS = gR <0 ,R = gRS. From [22],
production, capital and consumption must all grow at the same asymptotic
rate, so on all three paths:
gF = α gK +( γ +χ )gR + ν = gC = gK ⇒ (1−α )gC =( γ +χ )gR + ν [25]
The socially optimal path
[A5] and [23] ⇒ −η gC = ρ − FK [26]
18[A3], [A5], [A7] and [A1]
⇒ FR/FR = g<γ F/R>=FK − FS/FR
⇒ gC − gR = FK − (χ F/S)/(γ F/R)
⇒ gC = FK + (1+χ /γ )gR [27]
[26], [27] and [25]
⇒ (1−η )gC = ρ + (1+χ /γ )gR = ρ + [(1−α )gC−ν ]/γ
⇒ [(1−η )γ −(1−α )]gC = ργ − ν
⇒ gC =( ν −ργ ) / [(1−α )−(1−η )γ ] < 0 from [24] [28]
The privately optimal path with sustainability policy (τ C) only
[25] and [26] still hold, while FS is ignored so [27] is replaced by
⇒ gC = FK + gR [29]
[A15] and [23] ⇒ −η gC − τ C/(1+τ C)=ρ − FK [30]
[27], [30] and [25]
⇒ (1−η )gC − τ C/(1+τ C)=ρ + [(1−α )gC−ν ]/(γ +χ )
⇒ [(1−η )(γ +χ )−(1−α )]gC =[ ρ +τ C/(1+τ C)](γ +χ ) − ν
⇒ gC =[ ν −(ρ +τ C/(1+τ C))(γ +χ )] / [(1−α )−(1−η )(γ +χ )] [31]
The privately optimal path with sustainability policy (τ C) and environmental
policy (−τ S)
From [A19], the environmental policy is a resource stock subsidy −τ S = FS
= χ F/S (not constant), which causes [27] to be reinstated, while [30] still
holds, so
[27], [30] and [25]
⇒ (1−η )gC − τ C/(1+τ C)=ρ + [(1−α )gC−ν ]/γ
⇒ [(1−η )γ −(1−α )]gC =[ ρ +τ C/(1+τ C)]γ − ν
⇒ gC =[ ν −(ρ +τ C/(1+τ C))γ ] / [(1−α )−(1−η )γ ] [32]
19We can then see the interaction between the two policies: environmental
policy makes sustainability policy easier. The required strength of
sustainability policy (to make consumption constant, i.e. gC = 0) is lower if
environmental policy is already in place: −τ C/(1+τ C)=ρ − ν /γ from [32],
instead of the larger −τ C/(1+τ C)=ρ − ν /(γ +χ ) from [31].
12 The amount
of difference made by environmental policy is related to χ , the strength of
the stock externality in the production function.
However, we cannot show analytically that sustainability policy reduces
the required strength of environmental policy χ F/S, because the latter
changes over time. One would suspect, though, that such an effect could be
demonstrated numerically, thus matching the finding in Howarth and
Norgaard’s (1992) overlapping generations model.
5. Two extra results in more specialised economies
5.1 The powerlessness of resource incentives to achieve constant utility
We consider here a special case, where the economy is closed, there is no
resource discovery or renewal (D = G =0 ,s oS = −R), the discount rate ρ
is a positive constant, there is no technical progress in production (Ft = 0),
and there is no amenity effect of emissions (UE = 0). Since the resource is
finite and non-renewable, the resource depletion rate R be asymptotically
zero. With F = F(K,R) only and FKR > 0, it is then reasonable to make this:
12. When ν /(γ +χ )<ρ≤ν /γ , unlike in [24], no asymptotic sustainability policy is
required if environmental policy is enacted, but sustainability policy is still required
if it is not. When ρ≤ν /(γ +χ ), no sustainability policy is required in either case. In
all cases, one cannot tell whether utility rises or falls in the (potentially long) period
before development comes close enough to the asymptotic, balanced growth path.
20Assumption
On the path [A11]-[A20], limt→∞ FK =: ξ ,0 ≤ξ < ρ +δ . [33]
That is, no matter what policy instruments are used, the privately optimal
return on capital FK (the competitive interest rate) eventually falls below
ρ +δ . (Proving the exact conditions under which [33] holds is complex even
for simple economies, as shown by Pezzey and Withagen (1998).)
We can then establish:
Proposition: Under the above conditions, no matter what τ R(t) and τ S(t)
schedules the government creates as policy interventions, if these are the
only interventions, then limt→∞ U < 0. In other words, resource depletion
and resource stock incentives τ R(t) and τ S(t) are powerless to prevent
unsustainability in the form asymptotically falling utility.
Proof: Appendix 1(e) shows that under the above conditions, utility on the
policy path with intervention changes as
U= {[FK−ρ −δ −τ K−τ C/(1+τ C)]UC − R(UCS+η US/C)} C / η . [34]
Resource incentives τ R and τ S do not appear in [34], and since these are
the only policy interventions, τ K = τ C = 0. [33], with UC > 0 from [9],
then means that limt→∞ [FK−ρ −δ −τ K−τ C/(1+τ C)]UC < 0. Also UCS ≥ 0 and
US > 0 from [9], so the stock amenity term −R(UCS+η US/C) < 0. So both
terms in [34] < 0 asymptotically, hence limt→∞ U < 0. Q.E.D.
Of course, resource taxes and subsidies will have some effect on U, via
the return on capital FK, as seen from the Hotelling rule for the privately
optimal path with intervention which is calculated in Appendix 1(b):
21FK − δ − τ K
=[ ( d/dt)(FR−VR−τ R−τ EER)−τ S]/( FR−VR−τ R−τ EER) [35]
However, given the assumption in [33], no sustained (i.e. asymptotic) effect
of τ R and/or τ S on FK is possible. Intuitively, τ R and τ S can raise FK(K,R)b y
giving an incentive to increase the resource flow R, but such a non-vanishing
R can be sustained for only a finite time by a finite stock S0. [34] shows
that the only way to raise U by a sustained, finite amount is to use a
combined instrument such that eventually τ K + τ C/(1+τ C) < 0, i.e. a capital
subsidy and/or a falling consumption tax. The effect of this is to induce
people to invest more, when they would normally look for a return of at
least ρ +δ on their investment, but the marginal return on capital investment
is dwindling towards zero. The sustainability policy eventually involves the
need for lump sum taxes to pay for subsidies; for even if only the
consumption tax τ C is used, Appendix 2 shows that it must ultimately be a
100% subsidy:
limt→∞ τ C/(1+τ C) ≤ −(ρ +δ −ξ )<0 ⇒ limt→∞ τ C = −1 [36]
13
5.2 The separation of domestic allocation and sustainability policy in a
small open economy with limited environmental effects
Here we consider a special case of the economy which is still small and
open, but where there are no environmental amenity effects (UE = US = 0),
no environmental resource stock effects (FS = VS = 0), leaving only FE <0
as a possible environmental effect. As shown earlier, the only policy tools
that need to be considered are an emissions tax τ E(t), a stock subsidy −τ S(t)
13. As an example, one can show that a consumption tax/subsidy path τ C(t)=
[1+((1/α )−1)C −/K0]
α /(1−α )e
−ρ t−1 converts the PV-optimal path of the capital-resource
economy with discount rate ρ and F(K,R)=K
α R
1−α = K + C, to the Solow (1974)




22and a consumption tax τ C(t) (including a capital incentive τ K would add no
extra insight). In such a case, Appendix 3 shows that there is a separation
between domestic production decisions and environmental policy on the one
hand, and consumption, trade, foreign investment and sustainability policy
on the other hand. Specifically, because the interest rate r(t) is exogenous,
consumption (and hence utility U(C)) is completely determined by the
sustainability policy (τ C). Conversely, productive capital K, resource
extraction R, net resource exports Rx, resource discoveries D, abatement
capital Ka and abatement current spending a are completely unaffected by
sustainability policy, being affected only by environmental policy (τ E and
−τ S).
14 What does also change as a result of sustainability policy is a
country’s net imports M, and the rate at which it acquires foreign capital Kf.
Suppose now that the privately optimal path, with or without
environmental policy but with no sustainability policy intervention, would
follow a path where the economy’s natural resources are completely
depleted, and development is unsustainable. A sustainability policy will then
make no difference to how resources and production are managed; its only
result is less consumption and more saving, with all the saving being
invested in foreign capital. This is essentially another version of Fisher’s
(1930/1954, p271) "separation theorem", where the separation of
consumption and saving decisions from depletion and production decisions
follows from the exogeneity of the interest rate and resource prices.
14. However, if sustainability policy is present, then as previously argued, this
distorts the consumption decision so that environmental policy cannot achieve a
Pareto-efficient path. There may then be no unique aim for environmental policy.
23This scenario, of achieving sustainability by stripping domestic resources
and investing the proceeds abroad, would flatly contradict the idea that
sustainability requires resource policies. This idea, based on assumed non-
substitutability of humanmade capital for natural resources, and promoted by
Pearce (1988), Daly (1990) and many other authors since as one of the
cardinal rules of sustainability, is that domestic natural resources must be
conserved in some way. However, our derivation of a "strip resources and
invest abroad" policy is not intended to recommend it. Such a policy would
be wise only in the unlikely event that resources have only private
productive value, and no intrinsic, amenity or publicly productive value; that
capital will always be substitutable for resources in domestic production; that
all this is known with certainty; and that few other countries are planning to
adopt the same policy, so that no fallacy of composition occurs. If all
countries followed the policy, there would obviously be no abroad left to
conserve natural resources and accept incoming investments.
6. Conclusions
Using a fairly general, representative agent, neoclassical model of a
dynamic economy which is small and open, or closed, we have shown how
environmental policy and sustainability policy, terms used interchangeably
in much policy debate, can be defined theoretically in quite distinct ways.
They can be distinct in their aims, and in the instruments needed to achieve
these aims. Environmental policy was defined as dynamic intervention to
maximise intertemporal social welfare, and it needs to internalise the social
values of "environmental" stocks and flows that agents ignore when they
maximise private welfare. Sufficient instruments to achieve this are
incentives (taxes or subsidies, with any costs or revenues neutralised by
lump sum transfers) directly on the environmental stocks and flows, equal
24to their social values in equilibrium. Any incentives applied directly to
intermediate variables, like resource depletion or emissions abatement, will
be distortionary. This conclusion is unaffected by resource discovery and
extraction costs, trade in goods and resources, abatement of emissions by
current or capital spending, and exogenous technical progress, all of which
were included in our model.
By contrast, sustainability policy aims to achieve some improvement in
intergenerational equity, whether a general shift to a lower path of the utility
discount rate over time, or a specific aim to make utility forever constant,
non-declining or sustainable. We assumed, without giving any formal
analysis, that such equity could not be represented in the original social
welfare function based on individual preferences, and that people may
support governments that try to achieve intergenerational equity with a
sustainability policy which prevents welfare maximisation. In the absence
of lump sum intergenerational transfers or directly manipulable interest rates,
sustainability policy was showed to use consumption or capital incentives,
but not resource incentives, to affect consumption and savings choices over
time. However, this cannot achieve optimal sustainability (sustainability that
maximises some redefined measure of welfare), because optimality requires
an undistorted choice between consumption and investment. But policy can
achieve a sustainability objective on its own, such as constant utility.
Sustainability policy will clearly interact with environmental policy, but
it is hard to say how in general. We conjectured that environmental policy
that internalises the cost of cumulative pollution or resource degradation will
somehow improve sustainability. We showed analytically, in an asymptotic,
Cobb-Douglas,capital-resourceeconomy,howthepresenceofenvironmental
policy lowers the required strength of sustainability policy. The fact that
25sustainability policy requires incentives on consumption or capital is also
illustrated by results in more restricted economies. If the economy is closed
with a constant discount rate and strictly non-renewable resources, then the
net return to capital is likely to fall below the discount rate, which means
that resource incentives are ultimately powerless to achieve sustainability.
Only consumption or capital incentives, ultimately subsidies, will suffice.
If the economy is small and open with limited environmental externalities,
then not only does sustainability policy not use resource incentives, but also
it has absolutely no effect on resource management or domestic production.
It is then theoretically possible for a small economy acting in isolation to
achieve sustainable development while stripping its domestic natural
resources down to zero, as long as its consumption is restrained and enough
is invested in foreign capital stocks.
These results do not suggest that in a more realistic policy context,
sustainability and environmental policies can and should be considered in
separate, watertight compartments. The analysis is not at all complete, as
education and knowledge accumulation, international market power and
strategic interactions, cross-border environmental effects and second-best
policy instruments have all been ignored, and remain as obvious topics for
further work. However, our analysis does suggest a rather different focus
than has appeared to date in most neoclassical economic literature on
sustainability, which stresses definition, justification, measurement and
accounting rather than policy intervention. The focus is also different than
most ecological economic literature, which almost exclusively stresses action
to protect environmental resources. To be complete, sustainability analysis
needs to give more attention to policy intervention that will encourage
adequate saving and investment.
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We calculate the socially optimal path and the privately optimal path with
policy interventions, and thus the interventions which make the two coincide.
(a) The socially optimal path
From the Hamiltonian in [11], an interior solution to the problem of
maximising [10] subject to [2]-[9] satisfies the first order conditions:
∂ H/∂ C =0=UC − Ψ
K ⇒Ψ
K = UC [A1]
∂ H/∂ a =0=UEEa + Ψ
K(FEEa−1)
⇒ (UE/UC+FE)Ea = 1 [A2]








S/UC = VD, Ψ
S/Ψ
S = UC/UC + VD/VD





∂ H/∂ R =0=UEER + Ψ
K(FR+FEER−VR) − Ψ
S
⇒ (UE/UC+FE)ER + FR − VR = VD [A3]





x =( UE/UC+FE)ER + FR [A4]




⇒ UC/UC = ρ − FK + δ [A5]
∂ H/∂ Ka = ρΨ
a − Ψ
a = UEEK + Ψ
KFEEK − Ψ
aδ
⇒ UC/UC = ρ − (UE/UC+FE)EK + δ [A6]




⇒ UC/UC = ρ − r [A7]
∂ H/∂ S = ρΨ
S − Ψ





S = ρ − [US+UC(FS−VS)]/UCVD − GS
[A8]
27⇒ r − VD/VD =( US/UC+FS−VS)/VD + GS
[A9]
∂ H/∂ t = ρΨ
t − Ψ
t = UEEt + Ψ
K(FEEt+Ft−Vt) [A10]
(b) The privately optimal path with policy intervention
From the Hamiltonian [12], the first order conditions satisfied by an
interior solution of the privately optimal path with intervention are:
∂ H/∂ C =0=UC − Ψ
K(1+τ C)
⇒Ψ
K = UC/(1+τ C) [A11]
∂ H/∂ a =0=−Ψ
K(1+τ EEa)
⇒τE = −1/Ea [A12]




a = UC/(1+τ C)






S(1+τ C)/UC = VD
⇒Ψ
S/Ψ
S + τ C/(1+τ C)=UC/UC + VD/VD





K = UC/(1+τ C)
∂ H/∂ R =0=Ψ
K(FR−VR−τ R−τ EER) − Ψ
S
⇒ FR − VR − τ R − τ EER = VD [A13]





x = FR − τ EER [A14]




⇒ UC/UC − τ C/(1+τ C)=ρ − FK + δ + τ K [A15]
∂ H/∂ Ka = ρΨ
a − Ψ
a = − Ψ




a = ρ + δ +( Ψ
K/Ψ
a)τ EEK
⇒ UC/UC − τ C/(1+τ C)=ρ + τ EEK + δ [A16]






f = ρ − r
⇒ UC/UC − τ C/(1+τ C)=ρ − r [A17]
∂ H/∂ S = ρΨ
S − Ψ




S = ρ + τ S/VD
= UC/UC + VD/VD − τ C/(1+τ C)
= ρ − r + VD/VD [A18]
⇒ r − VD/VD = −τ S/VD. [A19]




Using [A15] and [A17] to derive
r = FK − δ − τ K, [A21]
[A21] and [A13] can then transform [A19] into
FK − δ − τ K
=[ ( d/dt)(FR−VR−τ R−τ EER)−τ S]/( FR−VR−τ R−τ EER), [35]
which is the Hotelling rule for the privately optimal path.
(c) Environmental policy
The tax paths that constitute environmental policy are those that make
identical the corresponding pairs of equations in the socially optimal and
privately-optimal-with-policy solutions:
Comparing [A1] and [A11]
⇒τC = 0, and hence Ψ
K = UC. [A22]
Comparing [A2] and [A12]
⇒τE = −1/EA = −(UE/UC+FE). [A23]
Comparing the pairs of equations from ∂ H/∂ Ia, ∂ H/∂ D and ∂ H/∂ M, and [A7]
and [A17], confirms [A22].
29Comparing [A3] and [A13]
⇒τR = 0. [A24]
Comparing [A4] and [A14], [A6] and [A16], or [A10] and [A20], confirms
[A23].
Comparing [A5] and [A15]
⇒τK = τ C/(1+τ C) = 0. [A25]
Comparing [A9] and [A18]
⇒ −τ S = US/UC + FS − VS + VDGS. [A26]
(d) An optimal sustainability policy?
Optimal sustainability aims to achieve the socially optimal path that would
result from maximising welfare W
σ (0) defined with a "sustainable" discount
rate σ (t), rather than with the rate ρ (t) that the representative agent uses in
private optimisation. The first order conditions satisfied by this W
σ -
maximising-path are as in [A1]-[A10], except with ρ replaced by σ in
equations [A5]-[A7], which together become:
UC/UC = σ − FK + δ = σ − (UE/UC+FE)EK + δ = σ − r [A27]
Inserting policies [17]-[20] into the conditions [A12]-[A20] for the privately
optimal path with policy intervention, can be seen by inspection to make
them identical with the equivalents on the W
σ -path. However, the need for
a non-zero consumption tax τ C, so that [A15]-[A17] can match [A27], means
that Ψ
K = UC/(1+τ C) in [A11] can never match the need for Ψ
K = UC in the
equivalent of [A1]. So no set of policies from those under consideration can
make the privately optimal path with intervention the same as the optimal
sustainable path.
30(e) Sustainability-only policy
We first calculate an expression for the rate of change of utility:
UC = UCCC + UCSS + UCEE
⇒ (UCC/UC)C +( UCSS+UCEE)/UC = UC/UC
= τ C/(1+τ C)+ρ − FK + δ + τ K from [A15] [A28]
Using UCC/UC = −η (C)/C, this means that
(−η /C)C = τ C/(1+τ C)+ρ − FK + δ + τ K − (UCSS+UCEE)/UC
⇒ C =[FK − ρ − δ − τ K − τ C/(1+τ C)+( UCSS+UCEE)/UC ] C/η [A29]
⇒ U = UCC + USS + UEE
= {[FK−ρ −δ −τ K−τ C/(1+τ C)]UC + UCSS + UCEE}C/η + USS + UEE [A30]
The capital tax τ K(t) and consumption tax τ C(t) that are needed to make the
privately optimal path with intervention have constant utility are thus
τ K + τ C/(1+τ C)
= FK − δ − ρ +[ ( η /C)(USS+UEE)+UCSS+UCEE]/UC. which is [21]
For later reference, when UE = 0 and S = −R, [A30] reduces to
U= {[FK−ρ −δ −τ K−τ C/(1+τ C)]UC − R(UCS+η US/C)}C/η which is [34]
Appendix 2
To prove: If τ C/(1+τ C) < 0 and bounded away from zero after some time,
then limt→∞ τ C = −1. Proof: the subsidy rate τ C > −1, or else an individual’s
desired consumption would be unbounded. Hence τ C < 0, to make
−τ C/(1+τ C) > 0. So limt→∞ τ C = −1+z for some finite z ≥ 0, and limt→∞ τ C =
0. But then limt→∞ [−τ C/(1+τ C)] = 0/z, and limt→∞ [−τ C/(1+τ C)] > 0 by
assumption. Hence z =0 .
31Appendix 3
If UE = US = FS = VS = 0, and the only policy instruments are τ E, τ S and
τ C, then [A12]-[A19], the first order conditions of the privately optimal path
with policy intervention can be rewritten (using [A36] in the derivation of
[A34] and [A35]) respectively as:
τ E(t)=1 / Ea(R-Rx,Ka,a,t) [A31]
FR(K,R-Rx,E(R-Rx,Ka,a,t),t) − VR(R,D,t) − τ E(t)ER(R-Rx,Ka,a,t)
= VD(R,D,t) [A32]
Q
x(t)=FR(K,R-Rx,E(R-Rx,Ka,a,t),t) − τ E(t)ER(R-Rx,Ka,a,t) [A33]
r(t)=FK(K,R-Rx,E(R-Rx,Ka,a,t),t) − δ [A34]
r(t)=− τ E(t)EK(R-Rx,Ka,a,t) − δ [A35]
UC(C)/UC(C)=ρ (t) − r(t)+τ C/(1+τ C) [A36]
r(t) − VD(R,D,t)/VD(R,D,t)=−τ S(t)/VD(R,D,t) [A37]
Equations [A31]-[A35] and [A37] are 6 equations which in principle
determine the 6 unknowns K, R, Rx, D, Ka and a. Resource discovery and
extraction costs V(.), domestic production F(.) and emissions E(.) are then
fully determined, independent of sustainability policy in the form of τ C(t).
τ C(t) completely determines C and U via [A36]; and if we choose a
sustainability policy −τ C/(1+τ C)=ρ −r, we achieve constant utility, U =0 .
The only other variables apart from C affected by sustainability policy τ C are
net imports M = C + δ K + V(R,D,t) − F(K,R-Rx,t), and hence
foreign capital Kf via Kf = rKf + Q
xRx − M.
So sustainability policy affects only C, M and Kf, not K, R, Rx, D, Ka or a.
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